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Book Review
Teaching the Law of Race
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA.

Edited By Juan F. Perea,t Richard Delgado,tt Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Anthony V Alfieri

INTRODUCTION

For too long, scholars have debated the place of race in the legal academy. Clothed in private silence and public quarrel,' the debate rises again
in the wake of the duly celebrated publication of Race and Races: Cases
and Resourcesfor a Diverse America. Situated at the intersection of civil
rights, jurisprudential, and interdisciplinary movements, Race and Races
provides a sweeping account of race in American law and society.' Interest
in this account will be keen for those seeking to understand the theory and
Copyright © 2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
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Gudridge, Angela Harris, Amelia Hope, Lisa Iglesias, Sharon Keller, Juan Perea, Susan Stefan, Jean
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I. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. RPv. 561 (1984); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques ofLegal Academia,
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practice of race in law, and equally important, in lawyering and ethics.3
Often stymied, advocacy-grounded efforts to grasp the meaning and take
the measure of race in action demand the mapping of law and the lawyering process in race cases along the boundaries of racial identity, racialized
narrative, and interracial community.4 Careful mapping enables lawyers
and judges to embrace race when relevant and, conversely, to reject it when
inapposite. Elsewhere I have argued that these boundaries starkly demarcate the practice of criminal law, particularly the prosecution and defense
of racial violence.5 Beyond the criminal law, however, the scope and depth
of racial boundaries lie largely unmarked.6
Accordingly, the first purpose of this Book Review is to mark the
boundary lines of contemporary sociolegal research on race synthesized by
the distinguished editors of Race and Races and tested, indeed sometimes
traversed, by the accompanying book reviews in this collection. In addition
to framing the bright lines of discussion for this rich collection, the second
purpose of this Review is to critique the effort by the editors to set down
some rough markers surveying the meaning of racial identity, the content
of racialized narrative, and the form of race-neutral and race-conscious representation. Race and Races establishes the groundwork for its analysis by
tracing the genealogy and multiplicity of race and racism, splicing race to
law, citizenship, culture, and society, and finally, adjoining race to legal
and social reform. To integrate these themes, the editors formulate certain
guiding principles of criticism. Applied to the sociolegal text of race, these
3. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discoveringthe Road
Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996); Richard Delgado, Making Pets: Social Workers,
"Problem Groups," and the Role of the SPCA-Getting a Little More Precise About Racialized
Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1571 (1999); Elaine R. Jones & Jaribu Hill; Contemporary Civil Rights
Struggle: The Role of Black Attorneys, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 185 (1999); Abbe Smith, Burdening the
Least of Us: "'Race-Conscious"Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585 (1999); David B.
Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REv.
1502 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Laviyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030 (1995).
4. Racialized narrative refers to the racial rhetoric (the race talk) found in the juridical
storytelling of lawyers and judges. Interracial community refers to the convergence and clash of
interests among communities of color. For a deft illustration of the mapping of narrative and
community in the context of race, see David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARv. L. REV.
1924 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA
(1999)).
5. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995);
Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997);
Anthony V. Alfieri, ProsecutingRace, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting
Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 800
(1996).
6. See Naomi R. Cahn, RepresentingRace Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 965 (1997); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and
the Straitjacketof Legal Practice,95 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1997).
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rules of reading urge us to "make the implicit explicit" and to "look for the
hidden norm" (p. 3). Moreover, they direct us to "avoid we/they thinking"
and "remember context" (p. 3). Further, they steer us toward "justice" by
contemplating "benefits and harm" (p. 3). Last, they exhort us to "trust
intuition" (p. 3). Against this backdrop of textual construction and criticism, the Review follows the discrete divisions of the casebook: Part I examines the genealogy of race and racism, Part II analyzes the multiplicity
of race and racism, Part III considers race, law, and citizenship, Part IV
explores race, culture, and society, and Part V assesses race and reform in
legal theory and practice.
I
THE GENEALOGY

OF RACE AND RACISM

Race and Races opens by evaluating the relationship between the
practices of racism and the concept of race. Racism, according to the editors, carries material and ideological import for both the collective and the
individual. For the collective, material racism infects the structure of social
life and state policy. For the individual, racism inflicts particularized harm.
Contingent on racial difference, these material practices find justification in
"a pool of beliefs, symbols, metaphors and images" that define a natural
order (p. 6).
From the outset, the editors challenge the natural order of race. Deploying the work of a wide variety of scholars, they assert that in American
history "racial hierarchy rather than racial equality has been the fundamental organizing principle" (p. 14). For example, Benjamin Ringer and
Elinor Lawless argue (pp. 6-11) that the genealogy of race and racism
originates in "the colonial expansion of the White European from the fifteenth century onward" (p. 6). Initiated by early Spanish conquistadors and
English settlers, this expansion created a dual colonial society, racially
segmented between dominant Whites and subordinate non-Whites. Tessie
Liu (pp. 11-12) shows how that duality, linked to European dynastic customs and colonial racial privileges, produced "bifurcated visions of
womanhood" (p. 11) that cast White women as guardians of civilization
and non-White women as both desexualized laborers and easily available
sexual objects. Such visions of privilege and their constituent categories of
racial and gender subordination permeated the structures of the colonial
world so thoroughly as to make them appear natural, even banal. It is precisely the banality and seeming naturalness of what Michael Omi and
Howard Winant call "racial dictatorship" (pp. 12-13) that allowed it to
shape historical notions of identity, color, and nationalism through coercion and consent (pp. 6-14).'
7. Omi and Winant remark that "hegemonic forms of racial rule-those based on consenteventually came to supplant those based on coercion" (p. 13).
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To amplify the ideas of physical force and ideological enforcement,
the editors weave together multiple theories of oppression, such as Iris
Young's politics of difference (pp. 14-15), and Robert Blauner's catalogue
of colonized minorities (pp. 16-20), offering a broad "account for the many
different ways in which [racialized] groups can be oppressed" (pp. 15-16).
The account also draws on Joel Kovel's psychohistory of White racism
(pp. 23-25), and Robert Williams's research on European racism and colonialism (pp. 26-28). It cites both conscious and unconscious forms of racist
microaggression, noting Robert Chang and Keith Aoki's work on nativism
(pp. 28-31), Linda Hamilton Krieger's study of cognitive bias (pp. 33-36),
and Charles Lawrence's writing on the unconscious (pp. 3741). It also
usefully recommends classroom exercises and scenarios elucidating the
individual, cultural, and institutional dimensions of racism. The classroom
exercises strive to discern the presence or absence of racism on college
campuses and city streets, as well as in high schools and in the media (pp.
20-23). Discernment, the editors remark, entails multiple theories and definitions of racism marked by the relationships of perpetrator and victim,
individual and institution, culture and society, ideology and practice, and
conscious and unconscious intent. Although often overt, the social and
cultural relationships of racism sometimes vanish under the neutral veil of
legal pedagogy (pp. 1145-54) and practice.8
In the practice of law and lawyering, racial microaggressions routinely
take the form of stereotyping at trial in criminal and civil actions.' Turning
to practice, the editors describe the microaggressions of racial stereotypes
in courtroom advocacy and trial testimony. Their account calls attention to
the "[a]mple evidence" of stereotyping suffusing the legal process. Surprisingly, the account fails to call for the establishment of an ethical duty to
refrain from or to avoid "triggering" racial advocacy, especially in criminal
cases. Instead, in an apparent concession to race-saturated lawyering, the
editors suggest that while lawyers' "playing of the race card" may be repugnant, the "special duty of 'zealous advocacy"' to criminal clients may
sometimes call for a defense lawyer to exploit party, juror, or public prejudice. Rather than resolve this tension, the editors use it to provoke reflection about the permissible ambit of lawyer professional responsibility in
race cases (pp. 36-37), leaving others to make the case for an ethical duty
to refrain from race stereotyping in the courtroom. °
Specifically, the editors show how private and public stereotyping,
and state-sanctioned exclusion and inclusion, take shape through a series of
material and discursive practices fashioning the definition of race. These
8. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989).
9. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supranote 5: Alfieri, Race Trials,supra note 5.
10. See Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, supra note 5; Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics,
supra note 5.
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practices can be glimpsed in Christopher Ford's work on state administrative differentiation in the classification of people by race (pp. 50-55), and
in Joe Feagin and Clairece Booher Feagin's writing on the development of
the concept of race in biology and social science (pp. 56-58). This work is
buttressed by Tessie Liu's analysis of race and gender as social categories
of knowledge and proof (pp. 58-59). In fact, Yen Le Espiritu contends that
the legal sedimentation of nineteenth-century racial categories produces a
kind of "pan-ethnicity" in the treatment of different minority ethnic groups
under the racial rubric of a single, dominant culture (p. 60). The tendency
toward pan-ethnic groupings in law and legal practices strains against
color-blind traditions in constitutional, statutory, and regulatory jurisprudence. This tension emerges in Neil Gotanda's examination of the false
color-blind quality of constitutional jurisprudence (pp. 61-63), Luis Angel
Toro's review of obscurantist ethnic classifications (pp. 64-69), and Tanya
Kateri Hernndez's exploration of "pseudoscientific" multiracial classifications (pp. 69-77). The editors marshal this literature to declare that "race
is fluid, rather than fixed" and to countenance "the increasing number of
openly multiracial people" (p. 77). The fluidity of multiracial identity categories adds complexity to the advocacy and adjudication of civil rights
claims, such as those at issue in the racial classification of American
Indians in Arthur Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities (pp. 7790).1 Civil rights advocates struggle to contain this fluidity both as a matter of strategy 2 and as a matter of professionalism. 3 Unfortunately, the
editors make no recommendations on how to cabin and sort out this growing complexity, moving instead to a discussion of multiplicity.
II
THE MULTIPLICITY OF RACE AND RACISM

With the theoretical foundation in place, the editors next trace the
particular histories and struggles of four groups: African Americans,
American Indians, Latinos/as, and Asian Americans. The juxtaposition of
those histories shows both the multiplicity and the unity of racism in the
United States. Multiplicity gains from both external and internal comparison of these diverse groups. Externally, their ranks span two centuries of
colonial and imperial expansion. Internally, their color, geography, and
political economy vary across region and locale. Yet, despite such differences, they experience unity in the changing caste of racial subordination.
11.
860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (discussing the extent to which provable genetic and
heriditary classification controls membership in a protected class under Title VII).
12. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators,
104 YALE L.J. 763 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
LaiiyeringPracticein Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 821 (1997).
13. See Russell, supra note 6.
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African Americans

For the editors, parsing the multiple strands of race and racism in
American history highlights "the constant, rational struggle of African
Americans against the oppression imposed upon them" (p. 91). That struggle frames the editors' discussion of African American history beginning
with the colonial assumptions made by the Framers, notably Benjamin
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. Their eighteenth-century view of race, difference, and the natural inferiority of African Americans animated the
early debate over slavery and secured its constitutional accommodation, in
spite of countervailing natural-law ideology and abolitionist judgment, best
exemplified by Frederick Douglass's essay The Meaning of July Fourthfor
the Negro (pp. 106-07).
To resolve this constitutional contradiction and to avoid the reductionism of property-based interest analysis, the editors focus on the "lived
experiences and histories" of race in American society (p. 107). They uncover those histories in the legal and social structures of slavery, citing the
text of the Virginia slave laws (pp. 108-11) and the violence of slave conditions disclosed in the despairing 1861 interview of Lavinia Bell (pp. 11214). Strict judicial enforcement sustained this regime of legal violence
erected upon the fear of slave insurrection and resistance. Examples include the perverse North Carolina and Louisiana state court opinions of
State v. John Mann (pp. 114-16) 14 and Kennedy v. Mason (pp. 116-18)."5
Both narrowly interpreted property and tort laws to endorse a slaveholder's
property rights in slaves "damaged" by third parties, but denied the slaves'
own rights to seek redress for abusive treatment. This jurisprudence of
state-sanctioned cruelty acquired sufficient force of logic to overcome the
sentiment of anti-slavery southern judges. Herbert Aptheker documents the
way this jurisprudence worked to suppress slave rebellion. Suppression
occurred not only through physical force, but also through the denial of
citizenship in Dred Scott v. Sandford (pp. 123-25), 6 a case later denounced
in Frederick Douglass's speech to the American Anti-Slavery Society (pp.
126-29).
Although they advert to the antislavery moral discourse of the
Abolitionist movement and the opprobrium towards slavery expressed
during the Civil War, the editors note the ambivalence and expedience of
the Reconstruction Era's attitudes toward African American equality, citing the core weakness in the equality principle soon manifested in an upsurge of federalism doctrine protecting state interests and in Jim Crow
14.
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829) (discussing whether a cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave
by the hirer is indictable).
15.
10 La. Ann. 519 (1855) (holding slave overseer liable to the owner for slave mistreatment
and killing).
16. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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segregation laws. Given legal encouragement from the Supreme Court's
holding in Plessy v. Ferguson(pp. 142-47),17 the Jim Crow Era of separatebut-equal laws not only disenfranchised Blacks through literacy qualifications, poll taxes, and the White primary, but also degraded their education
through deficient public schools and textbooks. Reinforced by the lynching
and mob violence recounted in Barbara Holden-Smith's historical digest
(pp. 149-51), this degradation and isolation extended even into the
American military both here and abroad in the twentieth century. In the
1918 French Directive (p. 153-54), for example, the U.S. Army attempted
to discourage fraternization between French and American Black troops
because it might incense White Americans.
Shifting to the modem era, the editors survey post-WWII segregation,
the rise of the NAACP, and the civil rights movement. Here they embrace
the early litigation campaigns crafted by Charles Hamilton Houston and
Thurgood Marshall, and the collective action and organized protest of the
Montgomery bus boycott and the student sit-in movement in Greensboro,
North Carolina (pp. 156-64). Skeptical of formal equality as a bulwark
against racial violence, however, the editors limit their celebration of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a dissonance
that haunts advocates and antiracist judges alike (pp. 129-72). To be clear,
that discordancy in no way inhibits the advocacy or enforcement of civil
rights remedies. Instead, it shrouds the pursuit of equality in the despair of
unrealized hopes."
B. American Indians
The editors continue their exploration of American racism by turning
to the history of American Indians, emphasizing the diversity and particularity of the Indian nations. Their starting point is the doctrine of conquest
and dominion depicted in Johnson v. McIntosh (pp. 175-78).19 Borrowing
from the work of Robert Williams on the cultural bias of federal Indian
law, the editors scrutinize the views of the Framers expressed in the 1783
correspondence of George Washington to James Duane and in
Washington's Third Annual Presidential Address to Congress, subsequently reiterated in the 1803 letters of President Jefferson to William
Henry Harrison and in Jefferson's Confidential Message Recommending a
Western Exploring Expedition. Surprisingly restrained in its racial tenor,
the Washington-Duane correspondence refers to the Indian nations as
17.
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of 1890 Louisiana statute providing for
separate railway carriages for the "white and colored races").
18. See DERRICK A. BELL,FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM

(1992); A. LEON

HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF
(1996); LIN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE (1994).

THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS

19. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussing federal court recognition of Indian tribal land
claims).
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"Savages" and "Wild Beasts of the Forest," while Washington's 1791
Presidential Address adverts to the "deluded tribes" of the Indian nations as
"an unenlightened race of men" (pp. 179-82). The Jefferson-Harrison letter
on Indian affairs urges the cultivation of the "affectionate attachment" of
the Indian nations through mercantile trade and debt accumulation; Jefferson's ConfidentialMessage similarly lauds the "wisdom" of economic exchange (pp. 183-84). Reflected in the substance of early federal Indian
policy, those views approved White expansion and Indian displacement,
through force and seizure if necessary (pp. 173-85).2"
The editors track these foundational views in the development of federal Indian policy under the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790 to
1834 and the Indian Removal Act of 1830 (pp. 186-88, 190). Echoed in
President Andrew Jackson's First Annual Message to Congress in 1829
(pp. 188-90), such views reached fruition in the White state law and land
seizure prerogatives of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (194-202),2' the asserted state sovereignty and constitutional resistance of Worcester v.
Georgia (202-07),21 and the frustrated federal criminal jurisdiction over
Indian reservations in Ex Parte Crow Dog (pp. 208-12).23 However deeply
contested, the judicially condoned state prerogatives of seizure and removal complemented the paternalistic expansion of federal court criminal
jurisdiction over Indian reservations in United States v. Kagama (pp. 21315)24 and the congressional splintering of tribalism under the plenary power
of the General Allotment Act of 1887 in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (p. 216)."5
While the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, recounted by Vine Deloria,
Clifford Lytle, and Felix Cohen (pp. 217-19), ended the policy of privatizing tribal land through allotment and renewed the notion of tribal sovereignty and the doctrine of reserved rights, the editors point to the identity
politics of the "termination period" as the reawakening of Indian consciousness-raising, resistance, and self-determination manifested in the
1961 Declaration of Indian Purpose (pp. 221-23) and the disputed employment preference of Morton v. Mancari (pp. 208-28).26 This reawakening, they add, evolved in tension with the diminished-rights claims of Lac
20. Consider also Jefferson's 1785 letter to the Marquis de Chastellux (p. 185) (comparing Indian
and Black claims to White equality).
21.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831) (reviewing Georgia statutory seizure of Cherokee land).
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (invalidating Georgia state law prosecution of Vermont citizen
for residing on Cherokee land).
23.
109 U.S. 556 (1883) (voiding Dakota criminal indictment, conviction, and sentencing of
member of Brule Sioux Indian nation).
24.
118 U.S. 375 (1886) (permitting federal criminal court jurisdiction over Hoopa Valley Indian
reservation murder).
25.
187 U.S. 553 (1903) (dismissing Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indian challenge to
congressional enactment of Allotment-era statutes as non-justiciable political question).
26. 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (rejecting non-Indian employee race discrimination and due process
challenge to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' employment preference program).
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du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty
Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc.2 7 and the eroded commitment to tribalism and
equality (pp. 228-30). It is unclear whether a similar normative deterioration Will impede the international human rights strategies of indigenous
peoples recalled by James Anaya and the legal rights struggle of native
Hawaiians (pp. 236-46).
C. Latinos/as
The historical experience of Latinos/as is marked by their survival of
a double conquest: first by Spain, and then by the United States through its
annexation of Texas and the 1846-48 War with Mexico. Stripping away the
rhetoric of Manifest Destiny, the editors reveal the familiar currents of
White supremacy and racial dominion driving the conquest of Mexico and
the invasion of Puerto Rico. Rhetorically, the currents of imperial superiority inform the history of the amendment and ratification of the 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (pp. 260-66). That history chronicles the
diminution of Mexican American citizenship claims, coupled with the dilution of their legal status and the restriction of their land ownership rights.
For illustration, the editors cite the citizenship borders of the California
Constitution of 1849 (pp. 266-67) erected to permit only White citizens to
vote. Bolstered in People v. De La Guerra (pp. 267-270),21 the borders
confirm that the treaty-ratified grant of citizenship did not guarantee the
possession of all political rights such as the exercise of the electoral
franchise in California. The editors demonstrate how United States courts
expanded these borders of exclusion by construing land grant claims to
dispossess Mexican property owners under the ideology of Manifest
Destiny in the Northern New Mexico land grant litigation (pp. 272-75), and
under the weight of cases such as John CharlesFremont v. United States
(pp. 275-78),29 De Arguello v. United States (pp. 278-80)," Botiller v.
Dominguez (pp. 282-83),31 and UnitedStates v. Sandoval (pp. 284-87).32
Having shown the futility of litigation and the ubiquity of violence,
the editors next count the varied modes of Mexican American resistance to
American conquest in the Southwest. Reciting the history of the Cortina
Wars and the New Mexico Land Grant Wars, as well as border folklore
27. 759 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (issuing preliminary injunction prohibiting private
individuals from interfering with the Chippewas' off-reservation spearing of walleye).
28. 40 Cal. 311 (1870).
29. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854) (confirming validity of Mexican American land conveyance).
30. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539 (1855) (affirming validity of Mexican land grant claim to California
ranch).
31.
130 U.S. 238 (1889) (approving federal statutorily created California Land Claims
Commission jurisdiction over private land claims of Mexican citizen).
32. 167 U.S. 278 (1897) (confirming land grants to individual settlers, rather than common lands,
in New Mexico territory).
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(pp. 293-99), they stress that Mexican American resistance continues in
contemporary battles over linguistic primacy, educational equality, and
agricultural labor. Fought out against the current backdrop of state bilingual education, the main linguistic battle concerns the merits of regional
bilingualism in Spanish and English (pp. 299-304). The educational battle
goes to the struggle against segregation in schools and public facilities (pp.
304-09). An even more pitched battle relates to the employment struggle of
Mexican immigrant agricultural labor in the fields of the Southwest, especially California. Inspired by the anti-immigrant impulse labeled "the new
nativism" by Gilbert Paul Carrasco, the exploitation and expulsion of immigrant labor enmeshes the Mexican and Filipino farmworker movement
in state and agribusiness disputes over land, wages, and working conditions
(pp. 310-19).
The cultural stigma marring Mexican American identity also sullies
Puerto Ricans. As a territory acquired in the Spanish-American War of
1898, Puerto Rico suffers a colonial relationship with the United States.33
American colonial rule of Puerto Rico, the editors explain, shapes legal,
political, and social status inside the territory. Rationalized by the ideology
of expansion and justified by the language of conquest, Puerto Rico's subordinate status is inscribed in both legislation and adjudication. Although
Congress granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans pursuant to the
Jones Act of 1917 (p. 341), Puerto Rico's commonwealth status deforms
the meaning of that citizenship for voting and equality purposes given that
the territory holds no sway in Presidential elections and commands no congressional representation (p. 347). Commonwealth status also makes possible disparate treatment of federal entitlements.
D. Asian Americans
Asian Americans, the editors contend, likewise suffer discrimination
in private and public spheres of American life. Because immigration connects both spheres, much of the focus of the Asian American chapter of
Race and Races is on immigration law. The editors point to the common
patterns of racism against all Asian Americans in immigration law despite
the historical, cultural, and linguistic diversity of the Chinese, Japanese,
Koreans, Filipinos, Asian Indians, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians.
Even a cursory examination of the history of labor immigration shows
signs of race-based exclusion and resentment, initially against the Chinese,
as illustrated by the ban on Chinese testimony in criminal and civil cases
enacted in People v. Hall (pp. 370-73)," 4 and later against the Japanese in
equally virulent fashion. That exclusionary history triumphed over
33. Under the 1898 Treaty of Paris (p. 327).
34. 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (prohibiting admissibility of Chinese testimony against a White defendant
in criminal trial). The California legislature repealed the ban in 1872 (p. 374).
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safeguards such as civil rights protections specifically negotiated by the
Chinese government on behalf of its subjects in the Burlingame Treaty of
1868 (p. 374) and also over the more general protections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870 (pp. 374-75). As a consequence, the Chinese faced intensifying racism not only from states, exhibited in the corporate employment restrictions of Article XIX of the California Constitution of 1879 (pp.
376-77), 3" but also from anti-Chinese hate groups (pp. 375-76). Statesponsored racism, the editors maintain, infected laundry, licensing, and
building code ordinances. The discrimination inherent in these economic
regulations, vividly displayed in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (pp. 378-81),36 was
surpassed by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (pp. 382-84), curtailing
the right to immigrate, and the Scott Act of 1888 (p. 384), restricting the
right to return. This brazen discrimination was repeated by the invidious
enactment of the 1892 Geary Act (pp. 388-90), the first race-based internal
passport system in the United States. Federal courts endorsed the exercise
of congressional power both to regulate the status of Chinese laborers (pp.
384-88) 37 and to control the flow of Chinese immigration (pp. 390-95),38
thereby condoning the nineteenth-century practice of public discrimination.
Although the first significant immigration of Japanese Americans occurred in 1885, later than that of the Chinese, they also suffered from the
enactment and enforcement of discriminatory legislation. Alien Land
Laws, such as the 1913 California Alien Land Law (pp. 398-99), and the
Washington Alien Land Law discussed in Terrace v. Thompson
(pp. 401-04),39 restricted aliens' ability to own or transfer land to those eligible for citizenship. By effectively prohibiting Japanese Americans from
qualifying for citizenship, such laws inhibited the social assimilation and
economic integration of the Japanese (pp. 401-04). The double blow of
Takao Ozawa v. United States (pp. 435-37), 0 upholding legislation rendering Japanese Americans ineligible for citizenship, and the World War II
curfew and internment orders imposed upon those of Japanese ancestry
residing along the West coast (pp. 406-12), badly undermined Japanese
citizenship status.4 These acts established the precursor for anti-Asian
35.

CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIX (invalidated 1880) (prohibiting employment of Chinese by

California corporations).
36.
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (overturning conviction under discriminatory municipal ordinance for
equal protection violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
37. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (recognizing the plenary pover of
Congress under the Scott Act of 1888 to prohibit from entering the United States Chinese laborers who
had departed before its passage).
38. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (companion cases) (affirming
dismissal of writs of habeas corpus issued on behalf of Chinese laborers arrested for violations of the
Geary Act's internal passport system).
39. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
40. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
41.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the validity of federal
curfew orders).
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violence. Rooted in the racial hierarchy of national identity and the attribution of "foreignness," violence against Asian Americans continues unabated, as demonstrated by the 1992 findings of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights (pp. 397-428).
III
RACE, LAW, AND CITIZENSHIP

Race and the forces of exclusion animating the law of immigration
frame the notion of citizenship. Construed in terms of both marked and
unmarked groups, citizenship embroils the concepts of democracy and
equality, sometimes erupting in violence. Race and violence permeate the
legal history of American citizenship, coloring the grant and denial of
status, and the caste of inclusion and exclusion. Historical studies, the editors contend, confirm the privilege of color in the imagery, transparency,
and invisibility of the status of Whiteness and the caste of otherness. 42 The
editors show that White color consciousness and supremacy gave rise to
the White-cabined citizenship eligibility of the Naturalization Act of 1790
(p. 429) and to the court-determined citizenship controversies over lightskinned non-European qualification in In re Ah Yup (Chinese) (pp. 43032), 43 Takao Ozawa v. United States (Japanese) (pp. 435-37), 4 and United
States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (Asian Indian) (pp. 437-40). 41 Fanned by
class conflict, that sense of supremacy also produced violence. The editors
link conflict and violence to the ideology of White racial purity. The belief
in racial purity, they explain, motivated an anti-immigrant sentiment toward the early twentieth-century European immigration of the Irish,
Italians, and Jews (pp. 445-53), and more recently toward Vietnamese
Amerasian refugees (pp. 441-44). For James Barrett and David Roediger
(pp. 445-52), the immigrant flight to Whiteness stems from an attempt to
escape the demeaning shadow of race and the corresponding danger of
violence incited by the nationalistic fervor of Manifest Destiny and the scientific supremacy of Social Darwinism. The same flight from the color line
encourages the effort to emulate White transparency in Black-for-White
passing.
In addition to the color-coded imagery of Black-for-White passing,
the editors suggest that White privilege manifests itself through the prevalence of a White aesthetic in art and literature. The cultural regulation of
racial caste under the gaze of this aesthetic mimics and reinforces social
hierarchy. Thomas Ross (pp. 465-68) and Linda Ammons (p. 468) decipher
42.
Stefancic
43.
44.
45.

See CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean
eds., 1997).
1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104).
260 U.S. 178 (1922).
261 U.S. 204 (1923).
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elements of racial hierarchy in the image of White innocence. D. Marvin
Jones (pp. 469-70) unearths the same properties in metaphor and story. The
editors imply that these properties insidiously grip the popular imagination,
corroding visions of the racial self and other, and thereby deforming the
classical liberal conception of personhood and mutuality. Intuitively appealing, this implication garners weak empirical support from the text of
Race and Races. The editors, for example, decline to explicate the sociology of the popular imagination, estimate the White aesthetic's corrosive
effect on the racial self, or measure its disparate impact on the public and
private spheres of the self. With sparing elaboration and evidence, they
seem to reiterate the axiom of the Black-White binary paradigm of race and
extend its reach to the arts. But the cultural inscription of race requires
more than broad-brush engrafting, especially in the performing and visual
arts. To be sure, White metaphor may be tied to the racial pride, nationalism, and supremacy of the White power movement documented by Elinor
Langer's study of American Neo-Nazi groups (pp. 479-484) and Mark
Mueller's research on internet hate groups (pp. 485-86). This tie is also
displayed in the racial paranoia of on-line newsgroups (pp. 486-88). That
cultural link, however, may be frayed by the dissonance of racial commitment and betrayal illustrated by Noel Ignatiev's conception of "race
traitors" (pp. 489-93). The race traitor idea nicely illuminates the contested
role of Whites in the struggle for equality. Both Frances Lee Ansley (pp.
493-97) and Barbara Flagg (497-99) point to the centrality of identity politics, racial allegiance, and White race consciousness to that struggle.
The editors take up the concept of racial equality as it applies to both
individuals and groups. Starting from the liberal framework of equality,
embodied in current Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, they point to the requirement of "comparing individuals" and
"ensuring that likes are treated alike" (p. 500). Under this framework, they
continue, individuals are reduced to atomistic entities "absent any relation
to others" (p. 500). Reductionism of this sort, they contend, makes it appear that the harm of racism is confined to "disparate individuals
unconnected by race or by the other categories that identify and connect
people" (p. 500). Well-known to critical race theorists,46 this critique of the
liberal subject and individual harm opens the door to an enlarged concept
of group and community identity. The editors believe that a more expansive concept of identity can be found in a postmodern vision of personhood
which "recognizes that individuals are more complex than an identifying
trait" (p. 501). More accurately conceived, individuals "exist as part of
larger groups-races, families, genders, sexual orientations, and many
other vectors that comprise identity" (p. 501). Decontextualizing the
46.

See BAnARA J. FLAGG,

LAW 1-65 (1998).
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individual from this identity foundation, the editors insist, results in not
only "unfair treatment," but also "a failure of equality" (p. 501). That insistence, couched within a critique of the individualized orientation of
equal protection remedies, fails to resolve the tension spurred by individual
and group competition over the scope of protection afforded by constitutional equality. Likewise, it fails to settle the conflicts between individual
equality and community sovereignty or self-determination. The editors appear to attribute this twin failure to the contested meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, its racialized constitutional origin, and its embattled development under the neutral formalism of color-blind doctrinal rationality.
The inequitable regulation of river port pilots in Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Commissioners4 7 shows the thinness of neutral rationality (pp.
506-09). The Japanese exclusion order approved in Korematsu v. United
States4" and the Mexican jury exclusion policy struck down in Hernandez
v. Texas49 demonstrate its unstable logic (pp. 511-19).
To test this logic, the editors introduce a number of readings criticizing the color-blind tenor of Equal Protection jurisprudence. For Reva
Siegel (pp. 520-33), the logic of constitutional scrutiny of racial and gender
classification is status-enforcing. Even when the classification embodies a
facially neutral policy, it incorporates existing hierarchical values and renews historical patterns of racial and gender inequity. Stephanie Wildman
(pp. 534-35) finds these values and patterns embedded in the rights discourse of anti-discrimination statutes regulating workplace equality. Parsing the application of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, she confronts
persistent strands of bias that survive in the form of unacknowledged
privilege. Examples of court-condoned privilege-based employment policies which operate differentially according to the employee's race include
the workplace grooming requirement prohibiting "corn rows" in Rogers v.
American Airlines (pp. 536-38)o and the English-only workplace speech
requirement in Garciav. Spun Steak Company (pp. 541-48).i A selection
by Mari Matsuda (pp. 551-61) shows how privilege and power may also
hinge, though less overtly, on workplace assumptions about the linguistics
of "standard" and deviant accents. Overcoming privileged positions in the
workplace, the editors admit, risks putting anti-subordination and raceconscious principles at variance. Of necessity, workplace elevation in the
47. 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (sustaining Louisiana river pilotage selection system based on practice
of nepotism).
48. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding constitutionality of 1942 civilian exclusion order directed at
persons of Japanese ancestry).
49. 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (reversing criminal conviction because of systematic exclusion of
persons of Mexican descent from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors).
50. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 198 1) (dismissing statutory claims of race and sex discrimination
in enforcement of airline grooming policy).
51.
998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting employment discrimination challenge of bilingual
workers to English-only workplace speech policy).
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form of race-conscious hiring and promotion clashes with the antisubordination principle of non-hierarchical treatment. Coupled with the
ascendant disparate treatment jurisprudence of Adarand Constructors,Inc.
v. Pena (pp. 564-70)52 limiting the ambit of affirmative action in the workplace, that clash threatens to weaken the search for equality across language, accent, hair style, dress, and skin color and, moreover, to undermine
multiracial representation in the workplace (pp. 500-79).
In the public sphere, infused by democratic norms of participation,
equality of citizenship and representation are closely allied with the idea of
voting. The editors record the historical struggle to realize this idea against
exclusionary practices endorsed by law, and enforced by state officials and
vigilante groups. Underscoring the importance of voting to equality, they
emphasize the role of law and legal rights vindication in strategic combination with political organizing and voter registration (pp. 588-89). Without this combination of advocacy and organizing, the editors fear the
continued disenfranchisement of communities of color by new methods, as
shown in the Supreme Court's acceptance of a transfer of authority away
from recently elected Black county commissioners in Presley v. Etowah
County Commission (pp. 618-30).13 Aroused by Robert Chang's account of
Asian American exclusion from avenues of political participation, they call
for the revitalization of democratic participatory norms and for heightened
practice in the "training for democracy" on behalf of both individuals and
groups (pp. 614-45).
Plainly, education stands as an essential part of democratic training.
For the editors, education is also an area where the state, the market, and
the law of property entwine with the geography of race. Using Margalynne
Armstrong's study of race and property values under conditions of entrenched segregation as a starting point (pp. 647-52), they find the roots of
educational inequality in the racialization of space caused by residential
segregation and housing discrimination. To demystify the natural order of
racialized space, the editors track the development of segregation in public
school education, culminating in the condemnation of Brown v. Board of
Education (pp. 675-82).14 The hardening of this racial order in the postBrown era sheds doubt upon the efficacy of group-oriented remedial strategies as the best means to ensure high-quality desegregated education.55 The
52. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a minority-preference program in federal
highway construction).
53. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race deprives the minority group's children of equal educational opportunities guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment).
55. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, TE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTS BRING ABoUr SociAL
CHANGE? 107-55 (1991); GIARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: TE SUPREME COURT
AND MiNoRrrms IN CONTIPORARY AMRICA (1993).
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Supreme Court's failure to fashion an appropriate remedy under the
Fourteenth Amendment for disparate state systems of public school financing in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (pp. 68695)56 and a similar failure to address residential patterns of segregation induced by "white flight" in Missouri v. Jenkins (pp. 697-708),"7 deepens that
sense of doubt. Commenting on the futility of litigation in the face of intractable segregation and educational inequality, Drew Days challenges the
very desirability of integration, particularly for Black males (pp. 710-22).
The erosion of the integrative ideal corresponds to a growing repudiation
of racial classifications in education and a move toward race-neutral admission procedures exemplified by the recent federal court retreat from
racial preferences to promote law school diversity in Hopwood v. State of
Texas (pp. 725-42). 8 A disturbing turn, this retreat may signal a shift in the
progress toward a more inclusive sense of citizenship and a more sensitive
racial aesthetic in American culture and society. Much of that progress
hinges on an enhanced appreciation of racial identity and group harm and
on an enlarged commitment to the public and private equality of democratic community.
IV
RACE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY

The advance and retreat of racial community is also visible in culture
and society. Although the translation of race from politics to culture and
society is imprecise, its lexicon of color-coded discourses infuses everyday
life in the popular mind and in the law. The editors explore the indefinite
connection between race, racism, and popular culture by compiling the
demeaning artifacts of outsider imagery and narrative that construct the
daily life of racial experience. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic assemble the artifacts of group experience from popular narrative (pp. 959-70),
showing how racial groups are similarly cast as outsiders. Margaret Russell
collects like images from modern film (pp. 970-73). The racial stereotypes
both exhibited and informed by cultural caricature extend beyond the Black
figure to infect the aesthetic of "foreignness" governing images of Asians
Americans (pp. 974-76), the "quaint" images of American Indians as vanished or strangely primitive people (pp. 991-94), and even the mythology
of Pocahontas (pp. 994-96). Linda Ammons's look at the credibility of
Black women's trial testimony demonstrates how these racial stereotypes
can play out in the courtroom (pp. 985-88). Combating caricature at trial 9
and in the arts, as Yolanda Broyles-Gonzilez observes in her account of
56.
57.
58.
59.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors,Race Defenders, 89 GEo. LJ. 2227 (2001).

2001]

TEACHING THE LAW OFRACE

the Farm Worker's Theater, depends on the mobilization of countervailing
power, racial memory, and community identity (pp. 976-79). According to
two pieces by Richard Delgado, it also rests on constraining racist impulse
through the formality of legal process (pp. 997-1001) and hate speech
regulation (pp. 1013-16).
For many, the editors admit, "free speech is a necessary condition for
community, solidarity, and self-fulfillment .... " (p. 758). Moreover, free
speech historically served the civil rights ideal by safeguarding minority
political protest, oftentimes with mixed results.6" Against this robust history of free speech guarantees to civil rights protest, the call for hate speech
regulation sounds widespread alarm among both civil libertarians and civil
rights activists, 61 even when limited to campus racial epithets. Unlike restrictions based on common law or statutory libel, 62 hate speech prohibitions rooted in the presumption of identity and community harm encounter
both judicial reluctance 63 and majority-based popular resistance, notwithstanding the doctrinal appropriateness of tort law in defamation. To the
editors, constitutionally-tailored hate speech regulation warrants sympathy
and enactment. Paradoxically, less speech may advance the denigration of
cultural identity and pluralism under "Official English" legislative initiatives (pp. 835-56). 64
For law, the paramount forum for speech is the oral, written, and social text of lawyering. The cultural denigration of the Black image and the
social subordination of the Black voice is sharply etched in the law and
lawyering of the criminal justice system. In the arena of crime and punishment, Juan Perea's astutely observed binary paradigm of White innocence
and Black guilt still largely prevails. This racialized paradigm survives in
60. Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (pp. 758-64) (throwing out breach of the
peace convictions of civil rights sit-in protestors on First Amendment grounds), with Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (pp. 764-68) (affirming convictions for trespass of protestors who marched
onto the grounds of a jail to protest the arrest of civil rights demonstrators), and Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (pp. 768-75) (upholding contempt sanctions against protestors who
defied an arguably unconstitutional anti-assembly injunction).
61. See Stephen G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 125 U. PA. L. REV.

193 (1996).
62. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (affirming criminal conviction under Illinois
libel statute); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reversing state damage award under
Alabama libel law for violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms of speech and the press).
Compare Doe v. Univ. of Michigan., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (enjoining
63.
administrative enforcement of University of Michigan policy prohibiting hate speech because it
violated the First Amendment), and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (proclaiming St.
Paul anti-bias ordinance facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment), with Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (approving Wisconsin penalty-enhancement sentencing statute punishing
bias-inspired conduct).
64. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (p. 848) (vacating
challenge to Arizona official English constitutional amendment as non-justiciable controversy); Ruiz v.
Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (pp. 849-57) (concluding that Arizona official English constitutional
amendment violates First Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights).
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spite of the recurrent White violence against Asians and Latinos (pp. 101923), the pervasive evidence of race-motivated police brutality (pp. 102834), and the disproportionate rates of Black male arrest and imprisonment
(p. 1035). Like the capital sentencing irregularities in McCleskey v. Kemp
(pp. 1076-87),65 these disparities may be attributable to racially neutral
policies, social norms, and cultural differences. Yet their unbroken continuity implies something more than neutral happenstance. Indeed, the enduring legacy of race and crime, either in the differential prosecution of
violence against women of color mentioned by Kimberl6 Crenshaw (pp.
1026-28), or in the racially based jury nullification reported by Paul Butler
(pp. 1045-47), lies in the ineradicable and seemingly evanescent quality of
bias in private offices, courtroom halls, and public streets.66
A similar bias, obdurate but elusive, marks the site of sexuality and
the family in American law. Traditionally thought of as a private realm
sequestered from the state, sexuality in communities of color, especially in
Native American and slave contexts, is heavily regulated through both
cultural and governmental encroachment. Under antebellum and postbellum regimes, the editors note, legal doctrines and evidentiary burdens bent
to accommodate White and Black hierarchy. For example, in Story v. State
(p. 886-89),67 a White woman's reputation for prostitution was not considered evidence of unchastity admissible to challenge her testimony that she
was raped by a Black man. Darren Hutchinson (pp. 890-93) and Catharine
MacKinnon (pp. 895-97) refer to the ongoing lack of juridical accommodation of difference in the marginalized treatment of gays, lesbians, and
sexual atrocity victims, specifically showing how the lack of police interest
in, and judicial awareness of, sexualized violence is exacerbated when victims are members of minority groups. The editors see some signs of progress in recent federal court decisions recognizing sexual assault as a basis
for a genocide claim according to international law and international war
crime tribunals, shifts that may signal the opening of gender hierarchies in
international law. They also look to the surprisingly recent repudiation in
American law of antimiscegenation statutes (pp. 909-18)68 as a hopeful
indication of a loosening of hierarchy-bound racial status in the field of
interracial intimacy. In the realms of reproduction and the family, however,

65. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting constitutional complaint of race-infected capital sentencing
determinations under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments).
66. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997) (affirming trial court issuance of
preliminary injunction under California anti-gang public nuisance statute).
67. 59 So.480 (1912).
68. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (p. 914-18) (striking down Virginia
miscegenation statute under Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment),
with Roldan v. Los Angeles County, 18 P.2d 706 (Cal. App. 1933) (p. 909-11) (upholding California
miscegenation statute).
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broad respite from
neither low-status women nor women of color enjoy
69
state intervention and the discourse of subordination.
V
RACE AND REFORM

The editors' exegetical reading of the sociolegal text of race in
American law and society concludes with a meditation on the role of law
and legal rights in obtaining reform. Canvassing multiple sites of racial
contestation, they urge varied methods of resistance in law, lawyering, and
political organizing. Resistance, they suggest, may spring from the logic of
law and the rights-based commitment of the reform-minded lawyer. This
optimistic stance, encouraged by Rennard Strickland's defense of AngloAmerican jurisprudence in tribal courts (pp. 1092-96), gathers strength
from the inheritance of civil rights statutes and grass-roots movements, like
that of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (pp. 1097-1104), which attack White
supremacy by boycott and nonviolent action.
To their credit, the editors are alert to the creative tensions accompanying lawyer-engineered social change. Those tensions are inherent in
coalition work. To mitigate the tensions spawned by inter-group conflict,
they recommend interracial conflict management (pp. 1109-14). Effective
conflict resolution hinges on the recognition of common interests and
stakes. The White stake in this multiracial outcome, they assert, comes
from linking up common systems of oppression and disclosing shared
goals of community uplift. Yet as Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado comment, that stake is of uncertain measure. Absent a commitment to equality
and racial healing, the divergent experiences and realities of race inhibit
meaningful cross-racial discourse, even given the pressures of assimilation.
Consequently, the editors look inward to the classroom and to the legal
profession for opportunities to build antiracist coalitions and interracial
communities (pp. 1091-1154).
CONCLUSION

The editors' inward turn to a classroom community and to a legal
practice accepting of"an obligation to learn about race and strategize about
how it could affect each case" (p. 1154) burdens Race and Races with the
onus of prescription in pedagogy and advocacy. However praiseworthy, the
text will not bear that heavy onus. Its principles of criticism leave us normatively unguided in the classroom and floundering in the vague context
of community. Its justice mandate lacks an algorithm to weigh benefit
69. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE (1994); DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiitual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L.
& Faimsm 51 (1997).
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against harm or to reconcile the competing claims of the individual and the
group. Its reliance on racial intuition misplaces faith where skepticism belongs.
To render prescriptive counsel properly, the editors must confront the
tension dividing modem and postmodem modes of analysis in the critical
race movement.7" Perhaps wisely, they leave that tension unmediated. Accordingly, they declare commitments to neutrality and race-consciousness.
They condemn and exploit the hegemonic logic of law. They ridicule and
embrace formalism and process values. They celebrate multiracial identity
and assail the ill-fitting methods of advocacy and adjudication. They deplore the limitations of rights-consciousness and agitate for its renewal.
Like others devoted to race-conscious change in the law school curriculum7 and its clinics,72 and in the profession73 and its ethos,7 4 they labor in
the ambiguity of this long moment of transition. The duration of this transition, its breadth, and its outcome are uncertain. The comfort of certainty
comes only from the realization that race will continue its hold upon law
and society, inciting rancor and inspiring reconciliation. Out of extraordinary devotion, the editors have carved a far-reaching path to reconciliation
and respect in a community of race. We should be grateful for their work
and hard-earned leadership. We should hope they do not grow weary.

70. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1647 (1997) (book review).
71. See Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta" Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric
Academics, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 315-40 (2000); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward
a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 1 (1989); Randall Kennedy,
Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal Academia, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 1985, 1992-2010 (2000).
72. See Bill Ong Hing, Raising PersonalIdentification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity Gender,
Sexual Orientation,PhysicalDisability and Age in Lawyering Courses,45 STAN. L.REv. 1807 (1993):
Michelle S. Jacobs, Peoplefotom the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling,
27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda Perez, Clinical Legal
Education and the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practiceinto
Theory, 51 SMU L. REv. 1423 (1998); Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach
Problem-Solving,4 CLINICAL L. REv. 65 (1997); see also Jon C. Dubin, Faculo , Diversity as a Clinical
Education Imperative, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 445 (2000); Lucie E. White, The Transformative Potentialof
ClinicalLegal Education, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 603, 605 (1997).
73. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentationof Minorities in the Legal Profession: A
Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, 95 MICH. L. RFv. 1005 (1997); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu
Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms: An InstitutionalAnalysis, 84
CALIF. L. REv. 493 (1996); see also David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A PreliminaryLook
at Black Partnersin CorporateLaw Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1999); David B.
Wilkins, Social Engineers or Corporate Tools: Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of
the Black Corporate Bar, in RACE, LAW AND CULTURE 137-69 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997); David B.
Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?: The Role of Legal Education in Shapingthe Values of Black
CorporateLawyers, 45 STAN. L.REv. 1981 (1993).
74. See David B. Wilkins, Beyond "Bleached out" Professionalism: Defining Professional
Responsibilityfor Real Professionals,in ETHICS INPRACTICE 207-39 (Deborah L.Rhode ed., 2000).

